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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Retention of trained and experienced personnel is essential to the
efficient functioning of all organizations. For the military under the total
force concept, there are three important methods of retraining trained personnel:
Active Duty reenlistment, Reserve reenlistment, and Reserve enlistment of prior
service personnel. This report analysizes and compares the Reserve enlistment
intentions and Active Duty reenlistment intentions of Active Duty Army personnel.
(A companion report will analyze Reserve reenlistment)
.
The major research questions were:
What are the significant factors which affect a member of the active
Army's decision to reenlist or leave the service and join a
Reserve/National Guard unit, or to lease with no further military
affiliation (turnover)?
What are the significant factors which affect the decision of a
member of the active Army who intends to leave Active Duty to join or
not join the selected Reserve?
What are the relative effects of economic, demographic, experience,
attituflinal, and alternative employment factors, if any, on the
military affiliation decision?
A conceptual model of turnover hypothesized both Active Duty reenlistment
and prior service Reserve enlistment intentions to be a function of demographic,
occupational, tenure, cognitive/affective orientation, and economic factors. The
1985 Department of Defense Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel was used to
generate a sample of first and second term Active Duty enlisted personnel.
The sample was partitioned into four groups by gender and term of service.
A preliminary bivariate analysis of retention and Reserve enlistment intentions
with the candidate explanatory variables yielded several interesting results. A
consistent finding across all groups was that the mean level of satisfaction with
the opportunity to serve one x s country was significantly higher for those who
11
intend to join the Reserves, or to reenlist, than for those who do not intend
seme military employment. Men who intend to join the Reserves had a
significantly lower mean perception of their chances of finding a good civilian
job than those who do not intend to join the Reserves. This was true for both
first and second termers. However, for both first and second term females, there
was no significant difference in the perception of civilian job opportunities
between women who intend to join the Reserves and those who do not intend to join
the Reserves. The mean perception of civilian opportunities was significantly
less for those who intended to reenlist than for those who do not.
A logit analysis was conducted for each gender/term of service group both
for the reenlistment decision and for the Reserve decision. The final models
included four composite variables constructed from eighteen cognitive/affective
questions c»rK3erning satisfaction with aspects of military employment.
Male Versus Female Intentions
Females tended to have both higher Reserve intentions and higher
reenlistment intentions than their male counterparts in each term of service
group, with the exception of the second term reenlistment decision. Perhaps
enlisted females who have survived up to the last year of their Active IXity
enlistment contract judge military employment to be more equalitarian than
civilian employment.
As expected, marital status affected male and female intentions
differently. For first term females, being married had a strong negative impact
on Reserve intentions. It had a strong positive impact for second term males.
Marital status was not significant for either first term males or second term
females. For the reenlistment decision, being married had a positive impact for
first term males. Marital status was not significant for the reenlistment
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decisions of females, either first or second term. As most human capital models
and our societal mores would indicate, the value to the family of market time for
married females is different than that for married males.
Reserve Versus Reenlistment Intentions
For both the prior service enlistment intention and Active Duty
reenlistment intention decision first term Blacks had more positive intentions
than first term Hispanics or Whites, with the exception of first term Hispanic
females. By second term, the only significant difference in Reserve intentions
or reenlistment intentions by race, was the higher reenlistment intentions by
Black females. For personnel in their second term, processes of self selection
and socialization to military life had removed most differences in military
affiliation intentions by race.
The most important difference between the factors affecting reenlistment
versus Reserve intentions was level of education. First term personnel with two
or more years of college education had almost forty percent higher Reserve
participation intentions than first term personnel with less than two years
college education. However, for reenlistment intentions, college education was
not a significant factor. This would seem to indicate that college educational
benefits may be a potential source of high benefit for recruiting prior service
personnel to the Reserves.
Another difference was the effect of current income. For all four
subgroups current income had a significant positive effect on reenlistment
intentions. However, current income while on Active Duty, did not have a
significant effect on the Reserve participation intention. By comparison,
perceived lower civilian opportunities had a negative effect both on Reserve
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I. INlHXUCnCN AND IJTH*ATORE KEVJLhW
The effectiveness of the military is dependent in large measure on the
skill levels and experience of its personnel. Technological advances throughout
the military necessitates not only attracting quality people, but the retention
of highly trained and experienced personnel. Thus, controlling turnover in the
military is a prime objective for manpower planners. Under the Total Army
Concept, there are three important methods of retaining trained personnel: Active
Duty reenlistment, Reserve reenlistment, and Reserve enlistment of prior service
personnel. Hence, an analysis of Army turnover should explicitly include Reserve
participation as an integral part of the analysis. Policies, especially those
which affect military pay, benefits, and quality of life must be accurately
targeted at factors affecting servicemembers , affiliation decisions.
This paper investigates the military affiliation intentions of Army
enlisted personnel. (A companion report analyzes Reserve reenlistment, Thomas
and Fithian, 1988) . Both full-time (Active Duty reenlistment) and part-time
(leave Active Duty and join Reserves) military affiliation is studied. The study
identifies the relative importance of factors which affect the intentions of
trained personnel to continue their military employment either on a full-time or
part-time basis.
A. Background
A recent review by Muchinsky and Morrow (1980) indicated that employee
turnover has been studied in more than 2000 publications over the last 75 years.
These studies have not been well integrated, having approached the subject from
various disciplinary perspectives such as economics, psychology, and sociology.
Psychologists tend to study turnover and its relationship to job satisfaction,
personality, intelligence, aptitude, and biographical data. Sociologists tend to
focus on the impact of structural determinants of turnover, such as occupation,
type of organization, and management style. Economists emphasize the
relationship between turnover, the business cycle, and inter-industry quit rates
on the macro level and pay and pecuniary benefits on the micro level. There is
no general agreement among researchers either on the relative importance of
factors causing turnover or the best model or approach for analyzing voluntary
turnover.
Extant literature has viewed turnover from a myriad of perspectives
examining relationships between actual turnover and explanatory factors such as
individual characteristics, work-related extrinsic and intrinsic factors, and
economic factors. Investigation of the basis for voluntary turnover behavior has
motivated research on two ancillary antecedent processes: job satisfaction and
the organizational commitment.
B. General Turnover Research
While the word "turnover" may evoke negative images of good people turning
their backs on an organization and leaving, turnover can be functional or
dysfunctional for an organization. Dysfunctional turnover is the voluntary
separation of people the organization desires to retain. A summary of potential
negative consequences is presented in Table 1 (Mowday, 1984) . Conversely,
functional turnover may result in positive consequences for the organization as
poor or undesirable performers quit or are forced out. This, ostensibly, could
lead to greater effectiveness and efficiency within the organization.
Mowday (1984) found at least two problems with viewing turnover only in a
negative sense. First, it neglects the number of potential positive outcomes
associated with turnover as suggested in Mobley (1982) , Mowday, Porter and Steers
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Table 1. Potential negative consequences of turnover
Increased costs; recruiting, selecting, training replacements.
Demoralization; those remaining may question their own position in the
organization and initiate search strategies for better positions.
Negative public relations; are the military services a good place to work?
Operational disruption; discontinuity in decision-making, unqualified
replacements, less developed job skills.
Strategic opportunity costs; unable to pursue growth strategies due to
insufficient manpower.
Decreased employee social integration; instability in work groups caused
by turnover may make establishing close social relationships at work more
difficult.
Undifferentiated turnover control strategies; incurring unnecessary costs
due to ineffective turnover control strategies
—
poor analysis of why
turnover occurs.
Source: Mowday 1984
(1982) , and Dalton and Tudor (1982) . One positive outcome is the increase in
upward mobility as turnover occurs "up the corporate ladder. 11 This assumes that
the relative capabilities and potential of prospective replacements and the
outgoing incumbent are not too drastically different. Turnover may also allow a
marginal performer to move into a vacancy which is a better job match for the
skills he or she possesses. The second problem with viewing turnover only as a
negative factor is that it may narrow the focus of appropriate managerial
responses to the retention of desired personnel.
Miichinsky and Morrow (1980) divided voluntary turnover into three major
classes of determinants: individual employee characteristics, work-related
factors, and economic variables. Table 2 breaks down these classes of
Table 2. Determinants of turnover and sign of effect
Individual Factors
Age (-) Intelligence (m)
Length of service (-) Biodata (m)
Vocational interest (m) Family considerations (m)
Family size (-,+) Alternate income sources (+)
Aptitude Personality (m)
Work Related Factors
Recognition/Feedback (-) Organization/job prestige
Job autonomy/responsibility (-) Pay (-)
Supervisory characteristics (m) Preemployment intervention (-)
Job satisfaction (-) Task repetitiveness (+)
Organizational oanmitment (-) Technology
Seniority provisions (m) Work unit size (+)
Role clarity (-) Work unit size (+)
Person-job congruence (-) Flex-time (-)
Occupation-role integration (-) Organization size
Economic Opportunity Factors
State of national economy (GNP, unemployment) (+)
State of local economy (+)
Type of industry (-)
State of industry (# job vacancies) (+)
Presence of secondary labor market (+)
Alternate institutional income sources (unemployment, welfare.) (+)
Note: (-) negative relationship to turnover
(+) positive relationship to turnover
(m) mixed relationship to turnover
Source: Muchinsky and Morrow (1980)
determinants, as well as their relationship (positive or negative) to turnover.
While Table 2 is not an exhaustive listing of relevant turnover variables, it
does include the principal determinants of turnover used in the majority of
analyses conducted to date. Each class of determinants consists of variables
which have been proposed as probable antecedents of turnover, and have been
established as correlates of turnover through empirical verification.
Regarding economic factors, it has been suggested that high quit rates are
a function of a secondary labor market, that is, an increase in the number of
women, teens, and nonwhite workers entering the labor force when jobs are widely
available. Secondary labor market members frequently drop out of the labor
market when more useful alternatives to paid employment appear (home service,
attend educational institution, etc.). Thus it has been hypothesized that the
existence of secondary labor markets increase voluntary turnover.
A more recent listing of the correlates of turnover as extracted from
turnover literature was compiled by Cotton and Tuttle (1986) . Three categories
of determinants were developed—external factors, work-related factors, and
personal characteristics. Table 3 displays these data. Cotton and Tuttle (1986)
parallel Muchinsky and Morrow's findings that age, tenure, pay, job satisfaction,
employment options and perceptions, and organizational ccmmitment are stable,
reliable correlates with turnover. The negative relationships of age and tenure
(length of service) with turnover was verified in earlier studies (Porter and
Steers, 1973; Porter et al., 1974; Price, 1977).
Correlates with turnover are plentiful, and many have been empirically
supported in numerous studies. Mobley (1982) cited the lack of research on
turnover as a process, stating that one-time measures and subsequent bivariate
correlational analyses are unable to detect changes in variables, an important
consideration in judging the validity of turnover models. This observation has
challenged researchers to devote less time to re-verifying correlates of
turnover, and to more fully investigating turnover models and developing process-
oriented theories of turnover.
Investigations of organizational turnover have typically examined simple
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Source: Cotton and Tuttle (1986)
relationships between job attitudes, perceptions, and turnover. Job satisfaction
is generally regarded as one of the more important antecedents of turnover,
showing a consistently negative relationship to turnover with correlations
ranging between .16 to .40 (Brayfield and Crockett, 1955; Docke, 1976; Porter and
Steers, 1973; Martin and O'Laughlin, 1984; Mobley, 1977; Mobley et al., 1979;
Price, 1977; Dallesio et al., 1984).
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Although job satisfaction is a global and multi-faceted measure, many
researchers have relied on a single item or selective index measure of job
satisfaction in their studies. Defining overall job satisfaction as the sum of
its many facets (discrete elements of which the job is composed) has been shown
to neglect some major determinants of job satisfaction.
One problem in the use of job satisfaction measures to identify problems
that may be causing high turnover within an organization is contamination of the
survey sample. Jackofsky (1984) substantiated that poor performers within an
organization are generally the least satisfied with their job. Thus, using a
single item measure of overall job satisfaction to survey an organization could
potentially mask important relationships in the turnover process.
Another useful construct for predicting organizational turnover is
organizational commitment, which concerns itself with the psychological
attachments to the organization that make voluntary separation difficult.
Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979) define organizational commitment as an
acceptance of the goals and values of the organization, a willingness to exert
considerable effort in behalf of the organization, and a desire to maintain
membership in the organization. It is the relationship between job satisfaction,
organizational commitment, and turnover that has prompted much of the latest
research for determining organizational turnover.
The major focus of commitment literature has been to identify antecedents
of commitment from a variety of categories of variables. These categories have
included personal and job characteristics, work experiences, organizational
factors, and role-related factors. Through a process of evaluating costs and
benefits, individual needs and desires are satisfied. The resulting affective
state becomes associated with the organization providing the job and its
associated characteristics and environment. Commitment results from this
association.
C. Turnover Modeling
Research into the development and testing of turnover models has lagged
behind research into determining correlating variables of turnover. March and
Simon (1958) developed a comprehensive turnover-participation model, including as
key decision variables; perceived possibility of intraorganizational transfer,
perceived desirability of movement, and perceived ease of movement as key
decision variables. Price (1977) utilized a psychological process model similar
to March and Simon, and extended the turnover process literature by introducing
sociological variables describing organizational conditions such as
centralization, co-worker integration, and formalization.
Porter and Steers (1973) developed a psychologically based turnover model
premised on the theory of "met expectations" to explain the basis of employee
turnover. Their model was devoid of structural and economic factors however, and
has received little follow-on research.
Mobley (1977) was one of the earliest proponents of the existence of a
withdrawal process as an intermediate linkage between job satisfaction and
turnover. The strength of the Mobley approach utilizing a withdrawal process
linkage was that it provided several testable hypotheses and addressed in depth
the interaction of psychological and economic variables. Structural variables
were conspicuous by their absence however.
A study was proposed by Mobley, Griffeth, Hand and Meglino (1979)
,
emphasizing the individual decision process. This model retained intention to
quit as the immediate precursor to actual turnover. Intention to quit was
determined by job satisfaction, attraction of and present utility of the current
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job, and attraction and expected utility of alternative jobs and roles. These
determinants were in turn moderated by the centrality of work values or the
nonwork consequences of quitting. Organizational, economic, personal, and
occupational variables are included as antecedents of perception, values, and
expectations of the individual. Individual perceptions and employment
alternatives play an expanded role in this model.
Bluedorn (1979) also developed a generalized voluntary turnover model.
The exogenous organizational structure variables include organizational control
(freedom and individual control of the worker) factors. The exogenous
organizational environment variables are labeled environmental push and pull.
Environmental push, the voluntariness of joining an organization, occurs at the
time of entry and entails the negative sanctioning of an individual for failing
to become a member of a specific organization. Environmental pull, comparison of
various employment options, operates continually after an individual joins an
organization, and refers to both the number of, and quality of higher unoccupied
roles. Bluedorn hypothesized the greater the push and/or pull, the greater the
propensity to leave the current job.
Steers and Mowday (1981) extended March and Simon (1958) with a 13-stage
model of the process of voluntary employee turnover. Included as antecedents of
turnover in their model were variables such as individual expectations, job
experiences, affective responses to the job, nonwork-related influences, intent
to stay, search for alternatives, and availability of alternatives.
Arnold and Feldman (1982) , hypothesized that while some variables have a
direct effect on turnover, other variables influence turnover through their
inpact on intent to turnover. Actual turnover was more strongly related to
intent to search, tenure, and perception of job security than intent to turnover.
D. Military Retention Research (Active Force)
A major difference between termination from military duty and civilian
employment is that the law specifically and severely limits the conditions under
which military personnel can terminate their service with the armed forces. The
focus in this research will be on voluntary terminations from the armed forces
which includes voluntary departures during an enlistment term, or terminations
through ncn-reenlistments.
Recent studies (Doering and Grissmer,1985; Gotz and McCall, 1980; Hiller,
1982; Warner, 1979; Warner and Goldberg, 1982; 1984) have concluded that
retention depends heavily on compensation. They find that retention rates are
sensitive both to the present and expected future value of compensation, and
that, because of the 20 year retirement program, after 10 to 12 years of service,
remaining in the military is almost always preferred to civilian employment.
Warner and Goldberg (1984) utilized the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL)
model for formulation of the reenlistment decision. The ACOL model is used by
Navy manpower planners to predict retention rates for various grades and years of
service. A choice based model, it assumes that on an individual evaluates the
utility associated with immediately leaving the service as opposed to reenlisting
for additional periods of service. Utility is calculated from two components.
The first component is the present value of the income stream of a selected
outcome (reenlist or leave) . The second component is the present value of the
monetary equivalents of the non-pecuniary aspects of the outcome. An individual
would tend to reenlist for an additional period of service only if the ACOL
exceeds the net benefits of civilian life. Expected military and civilian pay
and retirement benefits are the major variables used in this model. Warner and
Goldberg (1984) concluded from their research on the ACOL model that variation in
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the AOOL explained much of the variation in the probability of reenlisting.
Other studies measuring the effect of income differentials (Enns, 1977;
Hiller, 1982) on retention rates at the end of both the first and second term
indicate a similar sensitivity to present and future expected values of income.
Income differentials are caused by differences in pay over time, or due to
differences in promotion, skills, or performance. Because nearly every form of
pay differentials among individuals is nonrandom, ambiguous interpretation of the
results generally occurs. Bonus payments to alleviate personnel shortages in the
military are an example of nonrandom payments.
Besides the emphasis of research on compensation, additional behavioral
variables such as sea-shore rotation and family separation for Navy enlisted
personnel (Warner and Goldberg, 1982) as well as attitudinal variables (Chow and
Polich, 1983) have been included to explain retention rates along with the
standard pay and demographic variables. Doering and Grissmer (1985) cite the
need for more experiments in the military to expedite progress in retention
research. A limited number of experiments have been undertaken to measure the
effects of educational benefits, terms of service, and enlistment bonus payments
(Fernandez, 1985).
Hiller (1982) examined the roles of compensation, promotion, location, and
job satisfaction in explaining second-term reenlistment in the four services,
finding compensation to be a good predictor of enlistees 7 stated reenlistment
probabilities. Hiller also found that certain location and job satisfaction
variables were also important, and that the single best overall predictor of
reenlistment intentions was the enlistees' expectation of promotion to the next
higher grade. This measure reflects compensation somewhat, but also encompasses
such nonpecuniary factors as career success and nonpay benefits of promotion to
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the next higher level. Stolzenberg and Winkler (1983) concluded that
compensation is an important determinant of voluntary termination, and that
research has consistently failed to model the relationships among different
aspects of satisfaction with military service, including pay. Consequently, it
is difficult to assess the total effect of compensation on the termination
decision or to know if dissatisfaction with nonpecuniary factors fosters
dissatisfaction with remuneration.
Fredland and Little (1983) found job satisfaction was lower for the
military than civilians, and that specific elements of satisfaction, rather than
personal characteristics of the individual, account for most of this difference.
Reasons cited are military rotation policies, imperfect carryover of acquired
military training and skills to the civilian sector, perceptions of
organizational instability, and misinformation as to the nature of military jobs
and placement in those jobs (poor job-match) . Similarly they found that race,
marital status, education, tenure, hours worked, and labor market experience
appear to have little influence on job satisfaction in the military.
Balis and Hager (1983) found that individuals first term reenlistment
bonuses had a negative impact on second term reenlistment rates. This effect was
found to hold for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Goldberg (1981)
estimated a similar lagged bonus effect for the Navy to be negative and
significant as well.
Hand, Griffeth and Mobley (1977) found that incentives, organizational
practices, climate, job content, and job satisfaction, intentions, expectations,
demographic, psychological, aptitude, and performance variables, explained a
small percent of variance in turnover. Table 4 displays a listing of variables
found to be statistically significant in explaining actual and intended
12
Table 4. Reenlistment related variables










Potential for facing combat
Reservation wage















Nonpecuniary elements (e.g., patriotism, teamwork, etc.)
Travel opportunities
Source: Hand, Griffeth and Mobley, 1977
reenlistment, and was compiled from research conducted primarily between 1973 to
1977. These variables continue to appear in more recent research on the military
reenlistment problem. Carlisle (1975) and Glickman, et al., (1973) found that
pay and/or fringe benefits had little effect on the decision to reenlist, but did
affect the decision not to reenlist. Schneider (1973) also found that pay
accounted for a very small proportion of the variance in the reenlistment
13
decision for Navy personnel (less than 8 percent)
.
E. Military Retention Research (Reserve Force)
Merritt (1982) found that retirement benefits are substantially more
important than current pay levels for enlisted SELRES in the Navy. Pay was,
however, found to be the major determinant in the initial active enlistment
decision. Family, civilian employer, military peers, and friends were found to
be the strongest determinants of participation in the SEIZES. Job satisfaction
was found to be related weakly to participation, and slightly more important in
explaining withdrawal behavior.
Horn, Katerberg and Hulin (1978) tested three approaches to the prediction
of turnover of National Guardsmen. They found that three of five aspects of job
satisfaction (work, pay, and supervision) were significantly correlated with
reenlistment. When organizational satisfaction was added to the regression
equation, it improved the prediction of reenlistment. Organizational commitment
also predicted reenlistment intention and behavior, correlating .68 with the
intention, and .58 with the actual reenlistment decision. Ihey also found that
organizational commitment was a better predictor of these criteria than a linear
combination of job satisfaction measures. Finally, Horn, et al., found that
intention to reenlist was highly related to actual reenlistment (r=.67), and
correctly classified 80 percent of the cases.
Brinkerhoff and Grissmer (1984) cited pay, the extent of moonlighting,
unemployment, enlistment and continuation bonuses, educational tuition grants,
training, and general taste for the military as important determinants of
affiliation factors within the Reserves in an all-volunteer environment. The
quality and demographic composition of SELRES personnel is roughly comparable to
the active force.
14
Rostker and Shishko (1973) developed a theory of iroonlighting, or
secondary labor market participation, to explain the behavior of Air Force
Reservists. The theory identified several important economic variables in a
civilian moonlighting decision, including primary job hourly wage, primary job
hours, and secondary job hourly wages. Grissmer, Burright, Doering and Sachar
(1982) and Grissmer, Doering and Sachar (1982) indicated that expected results of
offering reenlistment bonuses to Army Reservists and National Guardsmen would
increase reenlistment rates by 30 to 40 percent. The actual result was only a
five percent increase in reenlistment rates, much smaller than anticipated. This
supported the notion that reservists do not behave like civilian moonlighters, in
contrast to Rostker and Shishko (1973). Grissmer, et al., conclude that the
Reserve job seems to be somewhere between a kind of "voluntary" participation and
the typical monetary-induced moonlighter.
Amey, Fechter, Huck and Midlam (1976) constructed a primitive Reserve
supply model using a simple theory based on elements of existing theories of
military occupational choice and secondary labor market participation. McNaught
(1981) tested this model and found that, for nonprior service accessions,
unemployment rate was the most significant variable. For prior service
accessions unemployment rate was not significant overall while primary wage was.
McNaught attributed the lack of significance of the unemployment variable for
prior service accessions to their greater labor market experience and larger
stocks of human capital.
Burright, Grissmer and Doering (1982) listed five aspects of Reserve
participation that set it apart from other second jobs and voluntary activities,
briefly:
Periodic full-time requirement of Reserve duty often conflicts with
primary job
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Legally cxxnmitted to at least one year up to six years of service
Reserve participation provides unique fringe benefits
Nonpecuniary rewards (patriotism, comraderie)
Inflexible Reserve schedule
Unique fringe benefits include items such as insurance, educational benefits, tax
benefits, and retirement benefits.
Summary
In summary, most turnover research has concentrated on identifying and
understanding the correlates of turnover. These studies have not been well
integrated, having approached the subject from various disciplinary perspectives
such as economics, psychology, and sociology. Psychologists tend to study
turnover and its relationship to job satisfaction, personality, intelligence,
aptitude, and biographical data. Sociologists tend to focus on the impact of
structural determinants of turnover, such as occupation, type of organization,
and management style. Economists emphasize the relationship between turnover,
the business cycle, and inter-industry quit rates on the macro level and pay and
pecuniary benefits on the micro level. There is no general agreement among
researchers either on the relative importance of factors causing turnover or the
best model or approach for analyzing voluntary turnover. Civilian turnover
models constructed from various hypothesized turnover processes have not, in
general, been empirically supported when applied in military studies.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF DATA. AND METfBDOIOGY
A. Research Objectives
Hie major objective of this study is to integrate hypotheses and research
methods from civilian labor force studies with existing military research
findings on turnover, and to develop and test a model which can be used to
explain affiliation intentions of first and second term enlisted personnel.
Major questions of interest include:
What are the significant factors which affect a member of the active
Army's decision to reenlist or leave the service and join a
Reserve/National Guard unit, or to leave with no further military
affiliation (turnover)?
What are the significant factors which affect the decision of a
member of the active Army who intends to leave Active Duty to join or
not join the selected Reserve?
What are the relative effects of economic, demographic, experience,
attitudinal, and alternative employment factors, if any, on the
military affiliation decision?
The research will investigate two discrete affiliation choices: (1) reenlist on
Active Duty, or not, and (2) leave Active Duty and join the Reserves/Guard or
not. In order to keep the samples as hamogeneous as possible, only first term
and second term Active Duty enlisted servicemembers with one year or less
remaining on their contract were included. The samples were further stratified
by including only servicemembers in specific paygrade and age windows for first
and second termers.
B. Data
The data used in this study were generated from the Department of Defense
1985 Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel. The survey was sponsored by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and
conducted to provide a basis for systematic examination of policy sensitive
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information about the military life cycle such as active and Reserve force
enlistment decisions, career orientations, responses to policies that affect
military members and their households, and decisions to leave the military
(Doering, etal., 1986).
The survey was fielded in January 1985 to a worldwide sample of
approximately 132,000 active-duty military members in all four services, also
were stationed either in the United States (O0NUS) or overseas on 30 September
1984. Officers, females, and Marine Corps personnel were sampled at a higher
rate to facilitate more detailed analyses of these groups. Each servicemember
sampled had completed a minimum of four months or more of active duty. Most of
the questionnaires were completed in March 1985, meaning that respondents in the
member survey were those who had completed 10 or more months of service at the
time of survey adriinistration. Data collection was completed in June 1985 and
70,025 usable enlisted member questionnaires (70.1 percent) were returned.
Three questionnaire forms were used, one each for officers, enlisted
personnel and spouses. The nine subject areas of the enlisted questionnaire,
which were virtually the same for officers, are described in Table 5.
For the purpose of retention analysis, the 1985 DoD Survey lacks the
questions regarding respondents' comparison levels of job attributes between
military and perceived alternative civilian employment which were available in
the 1978 DoD Survey (Doering et. al., 1980). Stolzenberg and Winkler (1983),
among others, have very persuasively argued for the need to use information on
the satisfaction of military personnel with military work, life, and pay relative
to the satisfaction on these dimensions that they believe would be available to
them as civilians. Unfortunately, the current 1985 Survey asked questions about
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satisfaction which were framed in an absolute mode, not a comparative one.
Table 5. Major subject areas of the
1985 DoD member survey
Military Information—Service, paygrade, military occupation, term of
enlistment.
Present and Past Locations—Length of stay, expected stay, problems at
present location and in moving to the location.
Reenlistment and Career Intentions—Expected years of service, expected
paygrade, probably behavior under different management options.
Individual and family Characteristics—Age, gender, marital status, number
and ages of dependents.
Dependents—Age, number, gender, physical and/or mental handicaps.
Military Oompensation, Benefits, and Programs—Valuation of military
medical services, commissary and exchange privileges, family programs,
base pay, allowances for guarters and subsistence, perceived tax
advantages
.
Civilian labor Force Experience—The household's civilian work
experiences.
Family Resources—Level of household debts and non-wage or salary sources
of income.
Military T.ifp>—Attitudes about various aspects of military life, including
compensation, interpersonal environment, and benefits.
For our study, data for Army enlisted personnel who were within 12 months
of the end of their term of enlistment, in their first or second contract term,
and who were not band members were selected from the 1985 survey. For the
purpose of studying interest in the Reserves of Active Duty personnel, these data
were analyzed for four groups:
(1) males in the first enlistment term,
(2) females in the first enlistment term,
(3) males in the second enlistment term, and
(4) females in the second enlistment term.
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To achieve relatively homogeneous groins representing these subpopu-
lations, several sample relative criterion were used. The Array first term
servicemembers selected for analysis were restricted to paygrades E2, E3, E4,
and E5, 18 to 30 years of age, one to six years of Active Duty and, if the
servicemember is an E2, less than two years of active duty. Second termers were
restricted to E4 and E5, 20 or more years of age, and 3 to 9 years of active
duty. Appendix A presents a schematic of this sample selection process.
C. Methodology
A conceptual model of the process of military service affiliation used
initially in this paper is
Military affiliation = f (demographic, tenure, cognitive/affective,
economic, and employment alternatives)
This model is derived from the turnover literature and will be used to
explain the military service affiliation intentions of first-term servicemembers
apprxDaching the reenlistment decision point. This model will be tested using the
enlisted servicemember' s responses to the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted
Personnel administered by the Defense Manpower Data Center. The candidate
variables used to predict military affiliation intentions were grouped into the
following categories:
Demographic—Biographical information allowing placement of
respondent in various groups for analysis.
Tenure—Variables which provide information about the respondent's
length of service and obligated service remaining.
Cognitive/Affective Orientation—Variables designed to assess an
individual's perception of, and attachment to, his/her job and the
Service.
Economic Incentives—Variables used to measure the relative financial
situation of the respondent with respect to other individuals and/or
families in both the military and civilian sectors.
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Perception of Employment Alternatives—The respondent' assessment of
alternatives to current military affiliation and perceptions of
military vs. civilian employment trade-offs.
The construct measuring military affiliation intention (dependent
variable) is the respondent's intentions regarding continued military affiliation
derived from responses to two survey guestions. The decision each respondent
faces is whether to:
reenlist, or
leave the military and join the Reserves/National Guard, or
leave the military and not join the Reserves/National Guard
The affiliation construct will be investigated by examining results of two
bivariate-choice based models for the reenlist and Reserve decisions
respectively. Each model will be analyzed individually as well as comparatively
to assess the impact of candidate explanatory variables on continued military
affiliation intentions.
For the two binary-choice models (reenlistment or not) and (join Reserves
or not) , the legit model will be used to analyze these unigue dichctomous
choices. The logit model is based on the cumulative logistic probability
function and can be expressed as:
ln[Pi/(l-Pi )] = a + B^ + B^ +...+B^iin + UA (1)
where Pi is the probability that the ith person will make a particular choice and
X-ji is the jth characteristic of individual i. Since the dependent variable in
this nonlinear equator is the log of the odds that a particular choice will be
made, Bj measures the impact of a change in Xj on the log of the odds, holding
the other explanatory variables constant.
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D. Variable Selection
1. Identification of Dependent Variables.
a. Reserve Intentions
Ihe measure of intention to join the National Guard or Reserve
is based on the response to the question "When you finally leave the military,








The dependent variable, RESERVE, was coded as a yes if the
respondent answered "definitely yes," and as a no if the respondent answered
"definitely no." All other responses were not included. By analyzing the
definitely yes or no responses, we hope to identify the relationship of Reserve
interest to the explanatory factors. Servicemembers who indicated that they
intended to stay in the military until retirement were eliminated from the
Reserve intention analysis since retired military are not eligible for the
Reserves. Intentions to stay until retirement were determined by the question
"When you finally leave the military, how many total years of service do you
expect to have?" Servicemembers intending to have 20 or more years of service
when they leave the military are considered to intend to retire. Appendix B
presents a crosstabulation of Reserve intentions with retirement intentions.
Excluding servicemembers who intend to retire, and
servicemembers who were not "definitely yes" or "definitely no" on their
intentions to join the Reserves, there were 208 first term males, 178 first term
females, 163 second term males and 167 second term females. Table 6 presents the
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Reserve intentions for each of the four groups. A higher percentage of women,
both in the first and second terms, intend to join the Reserves than men.
Table 6. Intentions to join the Reserves by
term of service and gender (in percent)
Intend to Join
Reserves/Guard Male Female
First Term 40.4 53.4
total n (208) (178)
Second Term 35.6 53.3
total n (163) (167)
b. Reenlistment Intention
The reenlistment criterion is based upon the question "How
likely are you to reenlist at the end of your current term of service?". The












In addition to the eleven point scale, a respondent could answer
"don't know," "I plan to leave service" or "I plan to retire." The dependent
variable, REENLIST, is coded as yes if the respondent answered "certain," "almost
sure," or "very probable." Responses of "I plan to leave service," "no chance"
and '•very slight possibility" are coded as a no for REENLIST. Appendix C
contains a frequency distribution of this variable for each of the four groups.
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The distribution of reenlistment intentions is shown in Table
7. A smaller percentage of first term males and females intended to reenlist
than of second term males or females. Both term of service and gender are
related to reenlistment intentions. For both males and females, first termers
had lower reenlistment intentions. First term males (25.6%) had a much lower
intention to reenlist than did first term females (37.1%). However, through
processes of socialization, employer selection, and self selection, there is
little difference between reenlistment intentions of second term males (49.2%)
and females (46.7%).
Table 7. Positive reenlistment intentions by gender
and term of service (in percent)
Intend to
Reenlist Male Female
First Term 25.6 37.1
total n (712) (496)
Second Term 49.2 46.7
total n (565) (475)
2. Candidate Explanatory Variables
As discussed in the literature review, variables used in the analysis
of the turnover decision can be grouped into five general factor categories:
demographic, tenure, cognitive/affective orientation, economic incentives, and
perception of employment alternatives. Within this framework, Survey guestions
were examined for construction of potential explanatory variables in these five
factor categories. These candidate variables are discussed below by category.
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a. Denographic and Occupational Variables.
A listing of candidate demographic variables and their values
are presented in Table 8. The variables race, age, education, mother's
education, father's education, marital status, number of dependents, and military
occupation are questions which were asked directly of the respondent in the
survey. Entry age, family status, and career field were created from one or more
questions from the survey.
The variable Race was receded into four dummy variables: White,
Black, Hispanic, and Other. Age at entry into the military was created from two
variables, age and months of service. Noting that age is in years and length of
service is in months, this variable is calculated as age minus the quantity
(months of service divided by 12)
.
A servicemember's years of education was used to create the
variable, college. Any servicemember with two or more years of college is coded
as a one for this variable. A servicemember with less than 14 years of education
is coded as a zero.
Mother's education and father's education were used to create a
new variable, maximum parental education. This variable is the actual years of
education of the parent with the most education.
Marital status and number of dependents have been combined into
one variable, family status. If a servicemember was single, divorced, separated,
or widowed he was considered single. A servicemember married for the first time
or remarried was considered married. This family status variable has four
categories: single, with no dependents; single, with one or more dependents;
married, with no dependents; and married, with one or more dependents. These
categories were treated as dummy variables.
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Table 8. Candidate explanatory demographic variables
Variable Description
Race White; Black; Hispanic; Other




Entry age in years
Education Number of years of education










or more years of college
Number of years of education of mother
Number of years of education of father
Actual number of years of education
Married first time; Remarried; Widowed;
Divorced; Separated; Single, never
married
Number of people related to respondent by
blood, marriage or adoption depending on
respondent for over half their support
Single, no dependents; Single, with
dependents; Married, no dependents;
Married, with dependents
MOS codes
Combat; Combat support; Combat service support;
Medical services
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The Army has over 300 MOS codes. To capture occupational
effects, these codes were reduced to four groupings to create the variable,
military job type: combat, combat support, combat service support, and medical
service.
b. Tenure variables
Tenure consistently has been found to be negatively related to
turnover. The tenure related variables from the 1985 DoD Survey are presented in
Table 9. As discussed earlier, time remaining in contract was used to select
individuals who were within one year of leaving the service. Also, enlistment
period was used as a criteria for separating servicemembers by term into
relatively homogeneous groups of first and second termers. Partitioning the data
by there important tenure variables will have the effect of yielding more models,
each having smaller explanatory power than a single aggregate model with these
tenure variables as explanatory variables. However, separate models for first
and second term will permit insight into how other factors vary in their impact
on the decisions of first and second-termers.
Length of service and paygrade were used to create the variable,
advancement rate, by dividing the months of service by the paygrade. The result
is an approximation of the average number of months in each paygrade for the
Table 9. Candidate explanatory tenure variables
Variable Description
Length of service Number of months of service
Paygrade Enlisted Paygrades E2; E3; E4; E5
Advancement rate Average number of months in each paygrade




The length of initial contract was determined for first term
servicemembers by adding the months of service remaining and the months served in
the military. This variable was constructed to indicate whether the initial
obligation was a two-year contract or greater than a two-year contract.
c. Candidate cognitive/affective variables
A list of cognitive/affective variables is presented in Table
10. These variables are used to assess servicemember's perception of and feelings
regarding their job and their relationship with the Army. The servicemembers





























For each variable the scale is:
Very dissatisfied = 1
Dissatisfied = 2
Neither satisfied
nor dissatisfied = 3
Satisfied = 4
Very satisfied = 5
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were asked to measure their level of satisfaction with issues particular to a
military way of life.
d. Candidate economic variables
A listing of candidate income and economic incentive variables
are presented in Table 11.
Table 11. Candidate explanatory income variables
Variable Description
Taxable military income Actual amount in dollars
Spouses income Actual amount in dollars
Spouse earns $200 Single, spouse not working, spouse earns less
or more per week than $200 per week; Spouse earns $200 or
more per week
Taxable military income was created by DMDC from the 8503 JUMPS
file. Spouse's income was reported by the respondent on the survey. A
dichotomous variable was created based on spouses income. This variable places
all single servicemembers, servicemembers with spouses not working, and
servicemembers with spouses who work but who do not make at least $200 per week
into one group. Servicemembers with spouses working and making $200 or more per
week are in the other group. It is hypothesized that a servicemember with a
spouse working earning $200 or more per week will be less likely to join the
reserves.
e. Candidate perceived employment alternatives
Thoughts of quitting, intentions to search for employment
alternatives, and intentions to quit, are all related to the availability, or
perceived availability, of alternatives to military service. Also, the chances of
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finding a good civilian job would affect the likelihood of leaving the military
and joining the reserves. Reserve force participation could be less likely if
the servicemember perceives that he/she will find a good civilian job.
The servicemembers evaluation of civilian employability is
measured by the likelihood of finding a good civilian job. This variable is
rated on a scale of zero to ten, with zero being no chance of finding a good
civilian job and ten being certain to find a good civilian job.
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HI. BIVARIATE ANAEKSIS
A bivariate analysis of the dependent variables by the candidate
explanatory variables is presented for each of the four groups: male first terra,
female first term, male second term, and female second term. An F-test was used
to determine satistically significant differences between Reserve/Not Reserve and
Reenlist/Not Reenlist subgroupings and the mean values of the continuous
candidate explanatory variables. A chi-square test of independence was used to
compare the differences of discrete candidate explanatory variables between the
subgroups defined by the dependent variables. Tables indicating the bivariate
results are given in Appendix D. The results of bivariate analysis for each
decision and each group are discussed below.
A consistent finding across all groups was that the mean level of
satisfaction with the opportunity to serve one's country was significantly higher
for those who intend to join the Reserves, or to reenlist, than for those who do
not intend some military employment. Men who intend to join the Reserves had a
significantly lower mean perception of their chances of finding a good civilian
job than those who do not intend to join the Reserves. This was true for both
first and second termers. There was no significant difference in the perception
of civilian job opportunities between women who intend to join the Reserves and
those who do not intend either in the first term or the second term. The mean
perception of civilian opportunities was significantly less for those who
intended to reenlist than for those who do not.
A. Reserve Intention
1. Male First Term
First term males who indicate they will join the Reserves differ from
ones who will not join the Reserves in several aspects. The future Reservist has
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more dependents to support, and is more likely to join the Reserves if he has
dependents to support whether he is married or single. Although a future
reservist does not have significantly less education than the nonreservist, his
parents have significantly less education than the nonreservist. A Black or
Hispanic servicemember is more likely to join the Reserves than White or all
Other races. The annual wages for a man who intends to join the Reserves are
higher than those of a man who intends not to join. The perceived employment
alternatives are fewer for someone intending to join the Reserves than for
someone who is not intending to join. Of the eighteen issues of satisfaction
with military life, all but three showed significantly higher mean levels of
satisfaction for those intending to join the Reserves than those not intending to
join. These three issues are satisfaction with friends, satisfaction with
coworkers and satisfaction with promotions. This indicates that the future
reservist is generally more satisfied with the military way of life than the
servicemember who decides not to join the Reserves. Appendix D.l shown the
characteristics of first term males by Reserve intention.
2. Females First Term.
Female reenlisters do not differ from nonreenlisters as much as the
males in the first term do. The only demographic characteristic upon which women
reenlisters differed from nonreenlisters is race. The proportion of Black and
Hispanic women who intended to join the Reserves, (67.8% and 66.7%) is much higher
than the proportion of White women who planned to join the Reserves, (43.6%).
Women reservists did not differ from nonreservists on any of the tenure, income
or perceived employment alternative measures. However, a difference in mean
levels of satisfaction for several of the cognitive/effective variables was
detected. These issues were satisfaction with stability, moves, serving country,
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training, security, working environment, VEAP, medical and dental benefits. For
each of these issues, women who intend to join the Reserves had a higher level of
satisfaction then women not intending to join the Reserves. Appendix D.2 shows
the characteristics of first term females by Reserve intention.
3. Males Second Term.
As with males in the first term, the servicemember who intends to
join the Reserves when he leaves the military has parents with a average maximum
education of one year less than the parents of servicemembers who do not intend
to join the Reserves. For these second termers the education of the mothers of
servicemembers who intend to reenlist is one year less than those who do not
intend to reenlist. Reservists also perceive their civilian employment
opportunities as fewer than those who do not intend to join the Reserves. Again,
the mean satisfaction of issues associated with military life are significantly
higher for those who intend to join the Reserves than for those who do not intend
to join. The only two issues which did not show a significantly higher mean
level of satisfaction for those who intend to join the Reserves are stability and
retirement benefits. The racial composition of those intending to join the
Reserves is different from those who do not intend to join. Half of the
Hispanics intend to join the Reserves, 48.5% of the Blacks and only 20.8% of the
Whites. Appendix D.3 shows the characteristics of second term males by Reserve
intention.
4. Females second term.
Females in the second term who do not intend to join the Reserves do
not differ significantly from those intending to join the Reserves on any
demographic, tenure, income or employment alternative variables. Additionally,
on the cognitive/affective variables, those intending to join the Reserves have a
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significantly higher mean level of satisfaction on only seven of the eighteen
issues of military life. These issues are personal freedom, friends, stability,
pay, family environment, serve country, and work environment. Appendix D.4
shows the characteristics of second term females by Reserve intention.
B. Reenlistment Intention
1. Male First Term
Male first termers who plan to reenlist also had more dependents than
male first termers who did not intend to reenlist. Additionally, they were older
currently and at entry. Black and Hispanic servicemembers were also more likely
to reenlist than not. Married servicemebers were more likely to reenlist than
singles, especially if they had children. The higher the paygrade the more
likely a person was to reenlist. In fact, no E2s intend to reenlist, while 25.8%
of the E3s, 44.2% of the E4s and 43.8% of the E5s intend to reenlist. E-2's
could be problem personnel who have had trouble in Active Duty and are positive
losses for the Army. This explains why first term men who reenlist have more
months of Active Duty, have a higher average advancement rate and earn more money
than nonreenlisters. As discussed in the literature review, turnover is related
to one's perception of other job opportunities. The members who intend not to
reenlist have a significantly higher perception of good civilian job
opportunities than servicemembers who intend to reenlist. Of the eighteen
facets of satisfaction with military life, reenlisters' mean levels of
satisfaction were significantly higher than nonreenlisters' on all but two
facets: VEAP and dental benefits showed no significant differences between mean
levels of satisfaction for reenlisters compared with nonreenlisters. Appendix
D.5 shows the characteristics of first term males by reenlistment intentions.
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2. Female First Term
First term females intending to reenlist differ significantly from
those not intending to reenlist. Reenlisters have more dependents, are
currently older, and were older when they entered the military. A higher
proportion of Black and Hispanic women intended to reenlist than White or Others.
Those married with children or single with children had a higher proportion of
reenlisters (49.6 and 42.9 respectively) than those single without children or
married without children (28.6 and 36.3). The proportion of reenlisters
increased as paygrade increased. There are no female E2s, one-third of the E3s
intended to reenlist, 53.3% of the E4s and 58.8% of the E5s intended to
reenlist. Again, this is why reenlisters have more months of Active Duty, a
higher advancement rate and earn more money. As was anticipated, women who
intend not to reenlist have a higher perception of good civilian opportunity than
women who intend to reenlist. Of the eighteen issues of satisfaction with
military life, only two issues did not show a significantly higher mean for
reenlisters than nonreenlisters. These were satisfaction with friends and
satisfaction with promotions. Appendix D.6 shows the characteristics of first
term females by reenlistment intentions.
3. Male Second Term
Second term males intending to reenlist do not differ demographically
except in their family status and occupation. Over half, 55.4%, of married
serviaemembers with dependents intend to reenlist compared to only 36.3% of
single servicemembers with no dependents. The military occupation with the
highest proportion of reenlisters is medical services and the occupation with the
lowest proportion of reenlisters is combat. Those servicemembers who intend to
reenlist have a significantly higher mean level of satisfaction on each of the
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eighteen military life issues. Appendix D.7 shews the characteristics of second
term males by reenlistment intentions.
4. Females Second Term
Those women who intend to reenlist for a third term have mothers
whose average years of education is less than for the mothers of those who do not
intend to reenlist. The higher the paygrade the higher the proportion intending
to reenlist. Thus, the average months of service and annual wages are higher for
those intending to reenlist than those intending to leave. The perception of
civilian employment opportunities is lower for those who intend to reenlist than
for those who intend to stay. Only seven of the means for the eighteen
satisfaction with military life issues are significantly higher for reenlisters
than for leavers: personal freedom, retirement, serve country, current job,
training, security, work environment, and VEAP. The differences between




The eighteen aspects of satisfaction with military life are highly
correlated with one another. To gain an impression of the interrelationships
present in this data, factor analysis was used as a method of transforming the
original variables into new uncorrelated variables. Table 12 lists the most
important variables for each of four factors. The factor groupings are listed in
their order of importance as indicated by their explained variation.
The factor analysis created four factors from the eighteen aspects of
military life. The first factor explains 29.8% of the variation within these
variables. This factor is composed of issues associated with a military type
job: satisfaction with current job, training, security, promotions, working
environment and serving country. The second factor is composed of aspects
(»ncerning military benefits and explains 8.4% of the variation. The issues
loading into these factors are satisfaction with dental, medical, commissary and
VEAP benefits. Issues associated with military life style, satisfaction with
moving, retirement, pay, stability and family environment, compose the third
factor, explaining 6.8% of the variation. Satisfaction with friends, coworkers,
and personal freedom are the aspects comprising the fourth factor, explaining
6.1% of the variation and is labelled relationships.
B. Model Results.
Results of the bivariate analysis were used to eliminate multiple measures
of the same attribute from the list of candidate explanatory variables, e.g.,
(parental education) . The final models include all four of the composite
variables constructed from the eighteen cognitive/affective questions concerning
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satisfaction with aspects of military employment. Table 13 presents the
variables which were used in the final reenlistment and Reserve models.
A logit analysis was conducted for each gender/term of service group both
for the reenlistment decision and for the Reserve decision. Appendix E presents
the logit results of the eight estimated models. Each table includes the
coefficient value and associated significance level for each variable when the
full model is used. In addition, to assist in ascertaining the relative
importance of individual variables, the coefficient value, associated
significance level, and percent correctly classified for each variable when used
individually in a single variable equation are included in these tables.
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Table 13. Variables in final models
Variable














Spouse earns over $200 a week
Satisfaction with military
Satisfaction with benefits
Satisfaction with military life style
Satisfaction with relationships
Value
1 if 2 year, otherwise
Continuous








Continuous; l=no chance, 10=certain
Continuous; avg. no. of months in each
paygrade




1 if yes; otherwise
Continuous; l=very dissatisfied,
5=very satisfied
As indicated in Table 13, each of the models presented in Appendix E were
estimated using sets of dummy variables for racial family composition, and
military occupation categories. For all models, the base case category for race
is "White plus Other" so the coefficients in the model for Black represents the
change in the log of the likelihood ratio of a Black joining the Reserves, or
reenlisting, in relationship to Whites and Others.
Family composition has been divided into four groups: single with no
dependents, single with dependents, married with no dependents, and married with
dependents. The base case category is single with no dependents. Unless
otherwise designated, combat was used as the occupation for the base case, so
that the coefficients for combat support, combat support service and medical
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service are in comparison to combat.
The logit Reserve intention model for males in their first term is
presented in Table E.l and is reproduced here. An interpretation of this Table
is as follows: This model is able to correctly classify 78.6% of the cases.
Without using the model, on average, 62.1% of the cases could have been correctly
classified. The full model contains four variables which are statistically
significant at the .10 level. Black has a large positive coefficient, indicating
that Blacks are more likely to join the Reserves. Members with two or more years
of college are more likely to join the Reserves than members with less education,
as is indicated by the positive coefficient. Two variables created by the factor
analysis are significant in the logit model: satisfaction with military job and
military life style. The more satisfied a member is with these issues the more
likely he is to join the Reserves.
The maximum number of years of parents education does not have a
significant effect in the full model, but when this variable is used alone to
predict Reserve force participation, it correctly classifies 65.0% of these
cases. The sign of the coefficient indicates that the more education the members
parents have the less likely he is to join the Reserves. The opposite
relationship holds true for the dummy variable which indicates if the member has
had two or more years of college education. In the full model, the variable is
significant and indicates that if the member has had two or more years of college
that he is much more likely to join the Reserves. However, when this variable is
used alone in a logit model it is not significant and does not improve the
ability to predict Reserve force participation.
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Table E.l Reserve intentions logit results,
first term males

























Full Model Sinqle Variable
Sign. Sign. % Correctly
Beta Level Beta level Classified
0.25 .95
-0.36 .64 -0.89 .04 62.1
-0.15 .24 -0.07 .43 62.1
1.57 .08 1.45 .02 65.7
0.45 .63 0.77 .27 62.9
-0.14 .79 0.20 .57 62.1
0.28 .74 0.16 .76 62.1
-9.10 .65 -7.88 .74 62.1
0.58 .52 0.77 .27 62.9
-0.96 .35 -0.80 .33 62.1
1.03 .12 0.81 .07 63.6
0.02 .84 -0.06 .38 62.1
-0.07 .61 0.05 .49 62.1
1.56 .06 0.21 .68 62.1
-0.03 .66 -0.11 .05 65.0
0.36 .23 0.25 .14 63.6
0.71 .61 0.52 .53 62.1
0.74 .01 0.82 .01 70.0
0.14 .57 0.25 .14 61.4
0.54 .05 0.52 .01 61.4
0.27 .29 0.28 .12 61.4
78.6
C. Effect of Individual Factors: Prior Service Reserve Intentions
The impact of individual factors on Reserve intentions or reenlistment
intentions can be measured by calculating the change in intention likelihood due
to changes in specific factors from a base case individual. Table 14 presents
the base case individual for all logit models. As indicated in Table 14, the
base case individual was slightly different in some models due to unavailability
of data and/or low sample size.
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^Not available for second termer model
2Combat MDS or Combat Support MOS for second term female Reserve model
3Single with or Single without dependents for second term male Reserve model
Table 15 presents the effects of individual variables on prior service
Reserve enlistment intentions. For the base case individuals, Reserve enlistment
intentions varies from a high of 34% for first term females to a low of 4% for
second term males. Appendix G discusses how the estimated logistic equation is
used to calculate the base case likelihood assessment and the partial effects
values in Table 15. Note that the low value of 4% in Table 15 is for a
particular base case scenario. If instead of marital status being single, a
second term male was married without dependents, then his Reserve enlistment
likelihood increases by 36% to 40%. In other words, if the base case family
status for second term males had been married without dependents, then in Table
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Table 15. Effect of individual variables on
prior service Reserve enlistment intention
Males Females Males Females
1st Term 1st Term 2nd Term 2nd Term
.27 .34 .04 .72
-.06 .18 a a
*.37 *.44 -.02 -.10
.10 .24 .00 .16
-.03 .14 .02 a
.06 .09 .03 .11
-.27 .22 .36 .05
.13 -.15 a .03
-.15 *-.21 *.42 -.07
.24 *-.21 *.16 -.17
*.37 *.42 .05 -.04
.16 .02 .05 .17
-.03 -.01 .00 .01
.00 *-.04 *-.02 -.02
-.04 .03 .01 -.12
-.01 -.03 *-.01 -.01
.08 .05 -.02 .05
*.04 *.03 .01 .01
.01 *.04 *.02 .01
*.03 *.03 -.00 .01
.01 .00 .00 *.02














Av. entry age + 1 yr
Av. civilian opportunities + 10%
Av. advancement rate + 3 months
Av. max. parental education + 1 yr
Av. annual wages + $1,000
Av. satis, w/military job + 10%
Av. satis, w/benefits + 10%
Av. satis, w/military lifestyle + 10'
Av. satis, w/relationships + 10%
n
aThis variable not included in model.
Coefficient of this variable is significantly different than zero at .10 level.
15 the base case Reserve intentions would have been .40 and in a variable row of
"single without dependents" for family status, the entry would have been -.36.
It is important to note that the assessments of the impact of change in
individual explanatory variables in Table 15 are not additive. They are
counterparts to partial deviatives and in each instance are calculated under the
condition that other explanatory factors are held constant at their base case
level. The impact of multiple changes in explanatory variables (alternative
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scenarios) is discussed later in this chapter.
Appendix F gives an example of how the estimated logistic regression
equation for Reserve enlistment intentions was used to calculate the base case
probabilities
.
Several interesting results are present in Table 15. Black male and
female first termers have a substantially greater interest in the Reserves than
do Whites, 37% and 44% respectively. While Hispanic first termers also have a
higher interest in the Reserves, they are not statistically significant
differences. Black second termers do not have a higher interest in the Reserves
than do Whites. A somewhat surprising result is that career fields are not
significantly related to Reserve intentions.
As expected, family status was a significant factor for prior service
Reserve enlistment intentions. For first termers, being married for females had
a negative effect in Reserve intentions, while for second term males, being
married had a positive effect on Reserve intentions. For second term females,
being married had a negative but not statistically significant effect on prior
service Reserve enlistment intentions. For second termers, it may be that the
economic incentives for married males increases Reserve enlistment intentions,
while for married females the value of nonmarket time decreases their Reserve
enlistment intentions.
The effect of college education was perhaps the most insightful for
potential policy implications. Compared to individuals with less than fourteen
years education, first term males and females with two or more years of college
education have 37% and 42% higher Reserve enlistment intentions, respectively.
Policies of providing college assistance for prior service participation in the
Reserves should be analyzed for their high potential for cost effective
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recruiting benefits.
Neither spouse earning over $200 per week nor entry age were significant
factors for Reserve enlistment intentions. While statistically significant only
for first term females and second term males, the effect of increased civilian
opportunities was to decrease Reserve enlistment intentions for prior service
personnel.
Advancement rate and wages did not have a significant effect on Reserve
enlistment intentions for any of the subgroups. This may be due to narrow
paygrade restrictions applied to the sample under analysis: E1-E4 for first
termers and E4-E5 for second termers.
Each of the composite satisfaction factors with active duty military life
had some significance for Reserve enlistment intentions. A ten percent increase
in average satisfaction with "military as a job" would increase Reserve
enlistment intentions for first term males and females by 4% and 3% respectively.
Satisfaction with benefits was significant only for first term females and second
term males. Satisfaction with military life style was significant only for first
termers. By time of second term, socialization and self selection have limited
the impact of differences in satisfaction with military lifestyle: those most
dissatisfied as first termers did not stay on to be second termers.
"Satisfaction with relationships," friends and coworkers, was significantly
related to Reserve intentions only for second term females.
D. Model Results: Active Duty Reenlistment
As with the Reserve decision, a logit analysis was conducted for each
gender/term of service group. Tables E.5 through E.8 present the reenlistment
model for first term males, first term females, second term males, and second
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term females respectively. In general, these models do not fit as well as the
counterpart Reserve Intention models. Data on bonuses and other reenlistment
incentives may be necessary to improve the fit of the reenlistment models.
Table 16 presents the effects of individual factors on Active Duty
reenlistment intentions. Race is important for first term reenlistment
intentions but is not significant for second termers. Black male and female
first termers have 28% and 19% higher reenlistment likelihoods than do their
white peers, respectively. Hispanics also had higher reenlistment intentions but
statistically significant differences only for first term females.
As with the prior service Reserve intentions model, career fields were not
significant factors for reenlistment intentions. As expected family status was
an important factor. Married personnel generally had higher reenlistment
intentions with the exception of second term married women. Full time military
employment for married women may present many obstacles for dual career
households. For married males, in relation to single males, the Army was
preferred to civilian employment. Compared to single males, first term males
married without dependents and married with dependents have 24% and 20% greater
reenlistment intentions respectively.
College education had nowhere near the impact on reenlistment intentions
that it had on prior service Reserve enlistment intentions. In fact, although
not statistically significant, it had the opposite effect for first and second
term females and second term males. College educational benefits would not
appear to be a viable reenlistment incentive policy.
Neither spouse earnings nor entry age were significant factors affecting
reenlistment intentions. Similarly, advancement rate was not an important
reenlistment factor.
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Table 16. Effect of individual variables on














Av. entry age + 1 yr
Av. civilian opportunities + 10%
Av. advancement rate + 3 months (b )
Av. max. parental education + 1 yr
Av. annual wages + $1,000
Av. satis, w/military job + 10%
Av. satis, w/benefits + 10%
Av. satis, w/military lifestyle + 10%
Av. satis, w/relationships + 10%
n
Males Females Males Females
1st Term 1st Term 2nd Term 2nd Term
.14 .46 .35 .38
-.05 -.07 a a
*.28 *.24 .02 .18
.07 *.22 .02 .03
-.04
.09 -.01 .06
.02 .25 .04 .07
.07 .20 .15 -.07
-.07 .08 .15 .11
*.24 .10 .15 -.06
*.20 .10 *.19 -.01
.05 .04 -.03 -.07
*-.09
.09 .04 -.07
.00 .02 -.01 -.01
*-.02 *-.04 *-.05 *-.02
.00 *.09 -.02 -.01
.00 .02 .00 -.01
*.04 *.08 *.08 *.14
*.02 *.03 *.04 *.03
.00 *.02 *.02 .00
*.01 *.02 .01 .00
*.02 *.02 *.01 .01
511 355 327 291
aThis variable not included in model.
Coefficient of this variable is significantly different than zero at .10 level.
"Ihis indicates a slower advancement rate.
By contrast, civilian employment opportunities was very important. It
appears that a 10% increase in assessed civilian employment opportunities would
reduce reenlistment incentives for all terms of service/gender groups. This
largest impact would be a 5% reduction in reenlistment intentions for second term
males. Another economic factor, increase in wages of $1,000 would have a
substantial impact on reenlistment. The largest impact would be on second term
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females with an increase in reenlistment intentions of 14%.
The satisfactions with aspects of military life factor had larger and more
significant effects on Active Duty reenlistment intentions than they did on prior
service Reserve enlistment intentions. This is understandable, since these
factors would be present if one reenlisted but would not necessarily be the same
if one joined the Reserves.
E. Alternative Scenarios
As indicated earlier, it is inappropriate to use the results in Tables 15
and 16 to estimate the effects of multiple changes in the base case scenarios.
The characteristics of the two alternative scenarios for first term male
servicemembers are presented in Table 17.
These two scenarios can be used to illustrate that the partial effects,
shown in Table 15, are not additive. Scenario 1 differs from the base case in
that: entry age is one year less than the average entry age, the servicemember
has a two-year contract, and the servicemember is Black. If the partial effects
from Table 15 were added to calculate the probability of Reserve intentions of
the new individual, the result would be:
Base case .27
- 1 yr entry age -.03
+ 2 yr contract -.06
+ Black ^37
.61
The probability of this individual joining the Reserves estimated by the full
model is .591 rather than .61. Appendix H presents the equation estimate for
scenarios 1 and 2. For scenario 1, not much accuracy would be lost by adding the
partial effects of these four specific changes.
However, using the partial effects from Table 15 to calculate the
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Satisfaction with military job
Satisfaction with military benefits
Satisfaction with military lifestyle
Satisfaction with military relationships
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probability for scenario 2 would produce a probability which is much less
accurate than that produced for scenario 1 using the partial effects. In this
scenario the servicemember is three years older than the average, has two years
or more of college education, is in a combat support MOS, is married with no
dependents, and his advancement rate is three months longer. If the partial
effects were added the probability of joining the Reserves would be:
Base case .27
+ 3 yrs entry age -.09
+ 2 yrs college ed. .37
+ combat support -.03
+ married, no dep. -.15
+ 3 months adv. rate -.04
.33
Using the logistic regression equation for the same scenario yields an estimated
probability of .231. In general, the partial effects tables cannot be used to




V. SuTMARY AND OCNCLUSICNS
This paper has analyzed two decisions of Active duty enlisted personnel:
reenlistment and Reserve participation. A general turnover model with five
categories of explanatory variables was used to model each decision. The
variable categories were: demographic, tenure, income and economic incentives,
perception of employment alternatives, and cognitive/affective orientation.
The data used to estimate the turnover models were from the Department of
Defense 1985 Survey of Active Duty Officers and Enlisted Personnel. To focus on
paygrades of highest interest and to keep the samples homogeneous, our study only
used first and second term enlisted personnel. To shorten the window between
intentions and opportunity to act on those intentions for the reenlistment and
Reserve decisions we further restricted our sample to servicemembers with one
year or less remaining on their current contract. Four separate models were
estimated in order to capture effects of differences by tenure and gender:
(1) males in the first enlistment term
(2) females in the first enlistment term
(3) males in the second enlistment term
(4) females in the second enlistment term.
logit models were used to estimate the two military affiliation decisions
for each of the subgroups using responses to questions regarding reenlistment
intentions and Reserve intentions. Note, the Reserve intention concept is not
uniquely a USAR intention. Rather, the Active Duty respondents were queried as
to whether they plan to join a National Guard or Reserve unit. Table 18 presents
a summary of the effects of individual variables in the eight estimated models.
A. Reserve Versus Reenlistment Intentions
For both decisions first term Blacks had more positive intentions than
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Table 18. Summary of signs of significant (a ) explanatory variables
in logit equations for Reserve and reenlistment
intentions by term of service and gender
RESERVE REENUST
1st Term 2nd Term 1st Term 2nd Term
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Two year contract N/A N/A N/A N/A
Entry age









dependents - + +
Married, with
dependents - + + +
Civilian











military job + + + + + +
Satis, with
military benefits + + + +
Satis, with military
lifestyle + + + +
Satis, with military
relationships + + + +
a
: Significant at the .10 or less level
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first term Hispanics or Whites, with the exception of first term Hispanic
females. By second term, the only significant difference in Reserve intentions
or reenlistment intentions by race, was the higher reenlistment intentions by
Black females. For personnel in their second term, processes of self selection
and socialization to military life had removed most differences in military
affiliation intentions by race.
The most important difference between the factors affecting reenlistment
versus Reserve intentions was level of education. First term personnel with two
or more years of college education had almost forty percent higher Reserve
participation intentions than first term personnel with less than two years
college education. However, for reenlistment intentions, college education was
not a significant factor. This would seem to indicate that college educational
benefits may be a potential source of high benefit for recruiting prior service
personnel to the Reserves.
Another difference was the effect of current income. For all four
subgroups current income had a significant positive effect on reenlistment
intentions. However, current income did not have a significant effect on the
Reserve participation intention. By comparison, perceived lower civilian
opportunities had a negative effect both on Reserve intentions and reenlistment
intentions.
B. Male Versus Female Intentions
Females tended to have both higher Reserve intentions and higher
reenlistment intentions than their male counterparts in each term of service
group, with the exception of the second term reenlistment decision. Perhaps
enlisted females who have survived up to the last year of their contract judge
military employment to be more equalitarian than civilian employment.
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As expected, marital status affected male and female intentions
differently. For first term females, being married had a strong negative impact
on Reserve intentions. It had a strong positive impact for second term males.
Marital status was not significant for either first term males or second term
females. For the reenlistment decision, being married had a positive impact for
first term males. Marital status was not significant for females, either first
or second term. As most human capital models and our societal mores would
indicate, the value to the family of market time for married females is different
than that for married males.
C. Future Work
The models presented in this paper assume that the decision to reenlist
and the decision to join the Reserves are concurrent. In fact Active Duty
military can only join the Reserves if they decide not to reenlist. Future work
could develop a hierarchical multinomial model which would first estimate the
probability of reenlisting; then, for those individuals who are predicted not to
reenlist, estimate their probability of joining the Reserves.
The dependent variables estimated by these models are Reserve and
reenlistment intentions. A request has been made to DMDC to match this survey
data with the master files to determine if these servicemembers actually
reenlisted, and if not, to determine if they joined the Reserves. These data
could be used for modeling actual behavior rather than intentions as a function
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Appendix B. Reserve intentions by military
retirement intentions by term of service/gender
Table B.l. Males 1st term
Retirement intentions
Reserve Don't No Yes Row
Intentions know Total
Definitely yes 84 20 104
11.6
Probably yes 9 179 40 228
25.4
Don't know 2 242 46 290
32.3
Probably no 1 92 26 119
13.2
Definitely no 5 119 17 141
15.7
Missing/not 6 8 3 17
eligible 1.9
Column 23 724 152 899
Total 2.6 80.5 16.9 100.0
Table B.2. Female 1st term
Retirement intentions
Reserve Don't No Yes Row
Intentions know Total
Definitely yes 1 94 16 111
17.9
Probably yes 1 129 24 154
24.8
Don't know 5 129 32 166
26.8
Probably no 1 81 11 93
15.0
Definitely no 2 81 6 89
14.4
Missing/not 6 1 7
eligible 1.2
Column 16 515 89 620
Total 2.6 83.1 14.4 100.0
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Table B.3. Males 2nd term
Retirement intentions
Reserve Don't No Yes Row
Intentions know Total
Definitely yes 3 55 44 102
13.1
Probably yes 3 98 84 185
23.7
Don't know 3 110 117 230
29.4
Probably no 3 47 52 102
13.1
Definitely no 1 104 40 145
18.6
Missing/not 5 7 5 17
eligible 2.2
Column 18 421 342 781
Total 2.3 53.9 43.8 100.0
Table B.4. Females 2nd term
Retirement intentions
Reserve Don't No Yes Row
Intentions know Total
Definitely yes 1 88 28 117
18.2
Probably yes 2 93 43 138
21.5
Don't know 108 72 180
28.0
Probably no 2 56 38 96
14.9
Definitely no 3 75 25 103
16.0
Missing/not 4 2 3 9
eligible 1.4
Column 12 422 209 643
Total 1.9 65.6 32.5 100.0
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Appendix C. Reenlistment intentions by term of service/gender
Likelihood of reenlistment Frequency
Males Females Males Females
Value Label 1st Term 1st Term 2nd Term 2nd Term
Don't know 24 12 20 17
Plan to leave 476 278 245 232
Plan to retire 8 4 19 4
Question not answered 13 7 8 3
No chance 27 21 22 8
Very slight possibility 27 13 20 13
Slight possibility 18 11 18 14
Some possibility 33 13 31 25
Fair possibility 13 17 20 20
Fairly good possibility 23 16 31 13
Good possibility 33 28 47 40
Probable 22 16 22 32
Very probable 24 27 29 22
Almost sure 61 38 74 58
Certain 97 119 175 142
Total 899 620 781 643
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Appendix D. Bivariate analysis of candidate explanatory variables
Table D.l. Characteristics of first term males by
Reserve intentions (mean/percent)
(concluded on next page)
:Mean
Join Reserves Significance
N no yes level
Number of dependents 208 0.4 0.6 .10
Age 208 22.2 22.0 .53
Age at entry into military 208 19.1 18.8 .32
Current education 207 12.4 12.2 .36
Mothers education 162 12.6 11.9 .11
Fathers education 165 12.9 12.2 .18
Maximum parental education 171 13.7 12.8 .10
Total months of Active Duty 208 32.4 33.9 .35
Advancement rate 208 8.4 8.5 .97
Basic annual wages 208 $9,072 $9,353 .05
Spouses annual wages 57 $3,428 $3,782 .87
Civilian opportunities 198 8.0 7.4 .10
Satisfaction-personal freedom 201 1.9 2.7 .01
- friends 202 3.5 3.7 .16
- coworkers 201 3.1 3.3 .17
- stability 200 2.7 3.2 .01
- pay 200 2.4 3.0 .01
- family environment 198 2.5 2.8 .03
- moves 198 2.8 3.1 .04
- retirement 198 2.9 3.2 .04
- serve country 198 3.4 3.9 .01
- current job 200 2.2 3.2 .01
- promotions 201 2.3 2.5 .24
- training 201 2.4 2.7 .04
- security 198 3.3 3.5 .06
- work environment 199 2.3 2.9 .01
- VEAP 200 3.3 3.7 .03
- medical 202 3.1 3.6 .01
- dental 199 3.3 3.7 .03
- commissary 201 3.1 3.8 .01
Percent
Race - White 145 69.0 31.0
- Black 29 31.0 69.0
- Hispanic 23 39.1 60.9
- Other 11 54.5 45.5 .01
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College - Less than 14 years
education

















































Table D.2. Characteristics of first term females by
Reserve intentions (mean/percent)




Number of dependents 178 .5 .5
Age 178 22.7 23.3
Age at entry into military 178 19.2 19.5
Current education 178 12.6 12.8
Mothers education 138 12.4 12.5
Fathers education 123 12.9 12.2
Maximum parental education 146 13.2 13.2
Total months of Active Duty 178 37.2 40.1
Advancement rate 178 9.0 9.5
Basic annual wages 178 $9,506 $9,690
Spouses annual wages 77 $2,997 $2,492
Civilian opportunities 171 7.1 6.6
Satisfaction - personal freedom 175 2.6 2.9
- friends 176 3.6 3.6
- coworkers 175 3.2 3.3
- stability 173 2.9 3.3
- pay 173 2.8 3.0
- family environment 171 3.0 3.1
- moves 174 3.0 3.2
- retirement 173 3.0 3.1
- serve country 171 3.5 3.9
- current job 171 2.9 3.0
- promotions 173 2.4 2.6
- training 175 2.8 3.1
- security 175 3.3 3.6
- work environment 173 2.7 3.0
- VEAP 174 3.5 3.8
- medical 175 3.0 3.4
- dental 174 3.5 3.8



























































Table D.2. Characteristics of first term females by
Reserve intentions (mean/percent)
(concluded)














College - Less than 14 years
education




































Income - Single; spouse earns
less than $200/week 160














Table D.3. Characteristics of second term males by
Reserve intentions (mean/percent)
(concluded on next page)
Join Reserves Significance
N No Yes level
Number of dependents 163 1.2 1.3 .74
Age 163 26.3 26.4 .88
Age at entry into military 161 19.6 19.4 .76
Current education 162 12.2 12.0 .18
Mothers education 110 12.0 11.0 .05
Fathers education 100 12.1 11.1 .14
Maximum parental education 115 12.7 11.7 .06
Total months of Active Duty 163 76.5 79.7 .17
Advancement rate 163 16.8 17.1 .57
Basic annual wages 163 $11,297 $11,476 .18
Spouses annual wages 87 $4,391 $2,967 .44
Civilian opportunities 150 7.9 6.5 .01
Satisfaction - personal freedom 156 2.3 3.1 .01
- friends 155 3.3 3.8 .01
- coworkers 153 3.0 3.5 .01
- stability 155 2.7 2.9 .28
- pay 154 2.3 3.0 .01
- family environment 149 2.8 3.2 .02
- moves 153 2.7 3.1 .05
— retirement 149 2.8 3.0 .20
- serve country 154 3.5 3.9 .03
- current job 155 2.5 3.2 .01
- promotions 153 2.2 2.9 .01
- training 154 2.4 3.1 .01
- security 151 2.9 3.5 .01
- work environment 154 2.6 3.0 .05
- VEAP 149 2.9 3.5 .01
- medical 156 3.0 3.6 .01
- dental 155 3.3 3.8 .01
- commissary 154 3.3 3.8 .01
Percent
Race - White 72 79.2 20.8
- Black 66 51.5 48.5
- Hispanic 16 50.0 50.0
- Other 9 66.7 33.3 .01
Married - No 68 72.1 27.9
- Yes 95 58.9 41.1 .12
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College - Less than 14 years
education
































Income - Single, spouse earns
less than $200/week 130












Table D.4. Characteristics of second term females by
Reserve intentions (mean/percent)
(concluded on next page)
Mean
Join Reserves Significance
N No Yes level
Number of dependents 167 0.8 0.7 .44
Age 167 26.8 27.2 .56
Age at entry into military 165 20.2 20.5 .60
Current education 167 12.5 12.7 .45
Mothers education 125 12.4 11.7 .14
Fathers education 110 12.2 12.0 .74
Maximum parental education 131 12.9 12.6 .50
Total months of Active Duty 167 75.2 75.6 .82
Advancement rate 167 16.4 16.0 .33
Basic annual wages 167 $11,367 $11,452 .49
Spouses annual wages 86 $ 1,551 $ 2,226 .44
Civilian opportunities 153 7.2 6.7 .29
Satisfaction - personal freedom 161 2.8 3.2 .02
- friends 161 3.4 3.7 .04
- coworkers 161 3.1 3.3 .41
- stability 160 2.9 3.3 .07
- pay 159 2.5 3.0 .01
- family environment 159 3.0 3.3 .05
- moves 161 3.0 2.9 .62
- retirement 159 2.9 2.7 .26
- serve country 160 3.4 3.9 .01
- current job 161 2.8 3.1 .18
- promotions 160 2.0 2.2 .17
- training 160 2.8 2.9 .66
- security 158 3.0 3.3 .11
- work environment 160 2.6 3.0 .03
- VEAP 158 3.2 3.2 .76
- medical 159 3.0 3.2 .42
- dental 161 3.6 3.5 .72
- commissary 161 3.2 3.4 .20
Percent
Race - White 64 50.0 50.0
- Black 82 46.3 53.7
- Hispanic 13 30.8 69.2
- Other 8 50.0 50.0 .65
Married - No 76 43.4 56.6
- Yes 91 49.5 50.5 .53
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College - less than 14 years
education
































Income - Single, spouse earns
less than $200/week 139













Table D.5. Characteristics of first terra males
by reenlistment intentions (mean/percent)





Number of dependents 712 0.4 0.7 .01
Age 712 22.1 22.7 .01
Age at entry into military 710 18.9 19.1 .14
Current education 710 12.3 12.3 .99
Mothers education 566 12.4 12.2 .33
Fathers education 548 12.5 12.1 .20
Maximum parental education 595 13.2 13.0 .55
Total months of Active Duty 712 32.6 37.5 .01
Advancement rate 712 8.3 9.0 .01
Basic annual wages 712 $9,161 $9,551 .01
Spouses annual wages 236 $2,909 $1,913 .12
Civilian opportunities 679 7.8 6.4 .01
Satisfaction - personal freedom . 700 2.3 3.0 .01
- friends 700 3.7 3.8 .05
- coworkers 696 3.2 3.5 .01
- stability 698 3.0 3.2 .01
- pay 696 2.7 3.1 .01
- family environment 695 2.8 3.2 .01
- moves 700 3.0 3.2 .01
- retirement 692 3.0 3.2 .02
- serve country 696 3.7 4.1 .01
- current job 699 2.7 3.4 .01
- promotions 691 2.5 2.9 .01
- training 700 2.5 3.1 .01
- security 694 3.4 3.7 .01
- work environment 696 2.7 3.2 .01
- VEAP 695 3.5 3.5 .58
- medical 700 3.3 3.6 .02
- dental 698 3.5 3.6 .13
- commissary 699 3.4 3.6 .03
Percent
Race - White 497 79.5 20.5
- Black 126 56.3 43.7
- Hispanic 61 67.2 32.8
- Other 28 82.1 17.9 .01
Married - No 469 81.4 18.6
- Yes 243 60.9 39.1 .01
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Table D.5. Characteristics of first term males
by reenlistment intentions (mean/percent)
(concluded)
N









occupation - Combat 232
- Combat support 311
- Combat support
services 122
- Medical services 34
College - Less than 14 years
education 637
- 14 or more years
education 73
Spouse
Income - Single, non working
spouse; spouse earns
less than $200/week 661
































96 57.3 42.7 .01
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Table D.6. Characteristics of first term females by
reenlistment intention (mean/percent)





Number of dependents 496 0.4 0.6 .01
Age 496 22.6 23.6 .01
Age at entry into military 496 19.1 19.5 .04
Current education 496 12.6 12.7 .38
Mothers education 401 12.2 12.2 .97
Fathers education 358 12.4 12.0 .20
Maximum parental education 416 13.1 12.9 .65
Total months of Active Duty 496 35.8 43.4 .01
Advancement rate 496 8.8 10.1 .01
Basic annual wages 496 $9,399 $9,856 .01
Spouses annual wages 232 $2,284 $1,276 .23
Civilian opportunities 473 7.1 6.1 .01
Satisfaction - personal freedom 490 2.5 3.2 .01
- friends 491 3.5 3.6 .29
- coworkers 484 3.2 3.5 .01
- stability 488 3.1 3.3 .04
- pay 487 2.9 3.1 .01
- family environment 484 3.0 3.3 .01
- moves 486 3.0 3.2 .01
- retirement 483 3.0 3.2 .01
- serve country 483 3.6 4.0 .01
- current job 484 3.0 3.2 .06
- promotions 486 2.5 2.6 .23
- training 488 2.9 3.2 .01
- security 483 3.4 3.7 .01
- work environment 485 2.7 3.1 .01
- VEAP 488 3.5 3.8 .01
- medical 486 3.1 3.6 .01
- dental 488 3.5 3.8 .01
- commissary 490 3.4 3.7 .01
Percent
Race - White 276 73.2 26.8
- Black 166 48.8 51.2
- Hispanic 37 51.4 48.6
- Other 17 58.8 41.2 .01
Married - No 259 68.0 32.0
- Yes 237 57.4 42.6 .02
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Table D.6. Characteristics of first term females by
reenlistment intention (mean/percent)
(concluded)














College - Less than 14 years
education












84 59.5 40.5 .07
410 63.7 36.3
86 59.3 40.7 .52
Spouse
Income - Single, non working
spouse; spouse earns
less than $200/week 456













89 42.7 57.3 ,01
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Table D.7. Characteristics of second term males by
reenlistment intentions (mean/percent)







Number of dependents 565
Age 565




Maximum parental education 440













































- serve country 548






























































































Table D.7. Characteristics of second term males by
reenlistment intentions (mean/percent)
(concluded)














College - less than 14 years
education



























Income - single, spouse earns
less than $200/week 450













Table D.8. Characteristics of second term females by
reenlistment intentions (mean/percent)





Number of dependents 475 0.8 0.8 .42
Age 475 26.6 26.5 .85
Age at entry into military 473 20.0 19.7 .40
Current education 475 12.7 12.6 .59
Mothers education 365 12.3 11.7 .04
Fathers education 312 11.8 11.4 .24
Maximum parental education 379 12.8 12.3 .14
Total months of Active Duty 475 74.3 76.3 .06
Advancement rate 475 16.1 15.9 .51
Basic annual wages 475 $11,309 $11,529 .01
Spouses annual wages 254 $ 2,147 $ 3,180 .28
Civilian opportunities 437 6.7 6.1 .03
Satisfaction - personal freedom 469 2.9 3.3 .01
- friends 470 3.7 3.7 .80
- coworkers 465 3.3 3.4 .14
- stability 466 3.2 3.2 .45
- pay 462 2.8 2.9 .51
- family environment 460 3.2 3.2 .96
- moves 470 3.1 3.2 .25
-
- retirement 467 2.8 3.0 .13
- serve country 468 3.7 4.0 .01
- current job 469 3.0 3.3 .01
- promotions 467 2.2 2.2 .69
- training 465 2.9 3.2 .01
- security 465 3.3 3.6 .01
- work environment 465 2.8 3.2 .01
- VEAP 464 3.2 3.4 .02
- medical 468 3.2 3.4 .13
- dental 468 3.5 3.6 .43
- commissary 469 3.4 3.4 .65
Percent
Race - White 188 61.2 38.8
- Black 231 45.5 54.5
- Hispanic 37 51.4 48.6
- Other 19 73.7 26.3 .01
Married - No 215 53.0 47.0
- Yes 260 53.5 46.5 .99
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Table D.8. Characteristics of second term females by
reenlistment intentions (mean/percent)
(concluded)














College - less than 14 years
education


























Income - single, spouse earns
less than $220/week 399













Appendix E. Logit models for Reserve intentions
and reenlistment intentions
Table E.l Reserve intentions logit results,
first term males
Actual Reserve Intention: 37.9%
Full Model Single Variable
Variable Sign. Sign. % Correctly
Beta Level Beta level Classified
Intercept 0.25 .95
Contract -0.36 .64 -0.89 .04 62.1
Entry Age -0.15 .24 -0.07 .43 62.1
Black 1.57 .08 1.45 .02 65.7
Hispanic 0.45 .63 0.77 .27 62.9
Combat support -0.14 .79 0.20 .57 62.1
Combat support service 0.28 .74 0.16 .76 62.1
Medical services -9.10 .65 -7.88 .74 62.1
Single with dependents 0.58 .52 0.77 .27 62.9
Married no dependents -0.96 .35 -0.80 .33 62.1
Married with dependents 1.03 .12 0.81 .07 63.6
Civilian opportunities 0.02 .84 -0.06 .38 62.1
Advancement rate -0.07 .61 0.05 .49 62.1
College education 1.56 .06 0.21 .68 62.1
Max. parent education -0.03 .66 -0.11 .05 65.0
Wages 0.36 .23 0.25 .14 63.6
Spouse earns $200/Wk 0.71 .61 0.52 .53 62.1
Military job 0.74 .01 0.82 .01 70.0
Benefits 0.14 .57 0.25 .14 61.4
Military life style 0.54 .05 0.52 .01 61.4
Relationships 0.27 .29 0.28 .12 61.4
N=140
% correctly classified 78.6
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Table E.2 Reserve intentions logit results,
first term females
Actual Reserve Intentions: 53.7'
Full Model Sinqle Variable
Variable Sign. Sign. % Correctly
Beta Level Beta Level Classified
Intercept 0.32 .93
Contract 0.73 .52 0.57 .52 53.7
Entry Age -0.05 .69 0.01 .86 53.7
Black 1.94 .01 1.37 .01 62.0
Hispanic 0.97 .34 0.57 .52 53.7
Combat support 0.57 .62 -0.53 .18 57.0
Combat support service 0.40 .73 0.20 .59 53.7
Medical services 0.91 .46 0.59 .22 53.7
Single with dependents -0.80 .32 0.09 .87 53.7
Married no dependents -1.20 .07 -0.57 .19 57.0
Married with dependents -1.21 .07 -0.19 .67 53.7
Civilian opportunities -0.18 .05 -0.09 .21 60.3
Advancement rate 0.04 .74 0.05 .42 52.1
College education 1.79 .01 0.59 .22 53.7
Max. parent education -0.11 .22 -0.06 .38 55.4
Wages 0.23 .42 0.22 .24 53.7
Spouse earns $200/Wk 0.11 .92 -1.13 .19 56.2
Military job 0.46 .08 0.09 .60 54.5
Benefits 0.66 .02 0.40 .04 53.7
Military life style 0.55 .04 0.24 .17 56.2
Relationships -0.03 .91 0.10 .56 54.5
N=121
% correctly classified 72.7
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Table E.3 Reserve intentions logit results,
second term males
Actual Reserve Intentions: 27. Oi
Full Model Single Variable
Variable Sign. Sign. % Correctly
Beta level Beta Level Classified
Intercept 11.11 .18
Entry Age 0.07 .66 0.01 .92 73.0
Black -0.86 .34 0.16 .77 73.0
Hispanic 0.03 .98 -0.42 .72 73.0
Combat support 0.46 .62 0.13 .81 73.0
Combat support service 0.70 .61 -0.37 .60 73.0
Medical services 2.85 .12 1.06 .31 73.0
Married no dependents 3.12 .02 0.34 .65 73.0
Married with dependents 1.87 .08 0.94 .08 73.0
Civilian opportunities -0.60 .01 -0.22 .04 73.0
Advancement rate 0.10 .49 0.06 .49 73.0
College education 0.91 .69 -0.11 .93 73.0
Max. parent education -0.36 .04 -0.19 .08 74.3
Wages -0.67 .20 0.35 .27 73.0
Spouse earns $200/Wk 0.94 .62 -0.11 .93 73.0
Military job 0.67 .14 0.31 .22 73.0
Benefits 1.79 .01 0.70 .02 71.6
Military life style -0.42 .32 -0.20 .46 73.0
Relationships 0.03 .93 0.01 .96 73.0
N=74
% correctly classified 86.5
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Table E.4 Reserve intentions logit results,
second term females
Actual Reserve Intentions: 55.0'
Full Model Sinqle Variable
Variable Sign. Sign. % Correctly
Beta Level Beta Level Classified
Intercept 0.38 .92
Entry Age 0.07 .42 0.01 .91 55.0
Black -0.44 .38 -0.27 .50 55.0
Hispanic 1.06 .31 0.77 .37 55.0
Combat support service 0.61 .29 -0.03 .95 55.0
Medical services 0.24 .70 0.15 .75 55.0
Single with dependents 0.13 .85 0.03 .96 55.0
Married no dependents -0.33 .60 0.00 .99 55.0
Married with dependent -0.73 .25 -0.29 .51 55.0
Civilian opportunities -0.11 .22 -0.05 .47 55.0
Advancement rate -0.18 .15 -0.12 .17 59.0
College education -0.20 .74 0.03 .95 55.0
Max. parent education -0.04 .62 -0.02 .75 55.0
Wages 0.24 .42 0.11 .65 55.0
Spouse earns $200/Wk 1.10 .27 0.97 .25 55.0
Military job 0.14 .55 0.21 .26 58.0
Benefits 0.11 .63 0.05 .78 55.0
Military life style 0.15 .50 0.05 .77 55.0
Relationships 0.41 .06 0.30 .10 57.0
tt=100
% correctly classified 60.0
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Table E.5 Reenlistment intentions logit results,
first term males
Actual Reserve Intentions: 23.9'
Full Model Sinqle Variable
Variable Sign. Sign. % Correctly
Beta Level Beta Level Classified
Intercept -3.42 .07
Contract -0.54 .23 -1.34 .01 76.1
Entry Age -0.02 .70 0.04 .37 76.1
Black 1.49 .01 1.17 .01 76.1
Hispanic 0.51 .30 0.50 .19 76.1
Combat support -0.37 .21 -0.29 .17 76.1
Combat support service 0.15 .69 0.24 .37 76.1
Medical services 0.47 .41 0.77 .05 76.1
Single with dependents -0.78 .19 -0.48 .30 76.1
Married no dependents 1.30 .01 0.51 .08 76.1
Married with dependents 1.14 .01 1.17 .01 76.1
Civilian opportunities -0.17 .01 -0.16 .01 76.1
Advancement rate 0.01 .86 0.11 .01 76.3
College education 0.35 .44 0.19 .53 76.1
Max. parent education 0.04 .39 -0.04 .32 76.1
Wages 0.29 .05 0.40 .01 75.5
Spouse earns $200/Wk -1.18 .10 -0.02 .97 76.1
Military job 0.68 .01 0.64 .01 75.7
Benefits -0.03 .80 -0.03 .79 76.1
Military life style 0.42 .01 0.46 .01 76.1
Relationships 0.45 .01 0.37 .01 76.1
N=511
% correctly classified 81.2
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Table E.6 Reenlistment intentions logit results,
first term females
Actual Reserve Intentions: 36.1%
Full Model Single Variable
Variable Sign. Sign. % Correctly
Beta Level Beta Level Classified
Intercept -8.16 .01
Contract -0.30 .65 -1.10 .05 63.9
Entry Age 0.10 .12 0.08 .08 63.7
Black 1.00 .01 1.06 .01 66.2
Hispanic 0.93 .06 0.71 .10 64.2
Combat support 0.37 .65 -0.57 .03 63.9
Combat support service 1.04 .20 0.29 .19 63.9
Medical services 0.81 .33 0.38 .17 63.9
Single with dependents 0.31 .47 0.33 .33 63.9
Married no dependents 0.42 .22 0.00 .98 63.9
Married with dependents 0.42 .22 0.63 .01 63.9
Civilian opportunities -0.15 .01 -0.13 .01 65.1
Advancement rate 0.12 .04 0.18 .01 67.0
College education 0.15 .69 0.21 .44 63.9
Max. parent education 0.06 .25 -0.02 .57 63.9
Wages 0.33 .06 0.54 .01 65.9
Spouse earns $200/Wk 0.36 .62 -0.02 .98 63.9
Military job 0.50 .01 0.26 .03 63.7
Benefits 0.26 .06 0.23 .04 63.9
Military life style 0.37 .01 0.25 .04 63.1
Relationships 0.25 .06 0.30 .01 64.2
N=355
% correctly classified 75.2
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Table E.7 Reenlistment intentions logit results,
second term males
Actual Reserve Intentions: 51.1'
Full Model Sinqle Variable
Variable Sign. Sign. % Correctly
Beta level Beta Level Classified
Intercept -2.08 .38
Entry Age -0.03 .59 -0.02 .63 52.6
Black 0.09 .75 0.21 .37 52.0
Hispanic 0.08 .84 0.19 .58 51.1
Combat support -0.06 .85 -0.21 .34 52.6
Combat support service 0.16 .70 0.03 .92 51.1
Medical services 0.61 .23 0.52 .18 51.4
Single with dependents 0.64 .24 -0.21 .60 51.7
Married no dependents 0.63 .18 0.02 .96 51.1
Married with dependents 0.79 .02 0.66 .01 58.1
Civilian opportunities -0.23 .01 -0.20 .01 61.8
Advancement rate -0.03 .55 -0.03 .41 50.8
College education -0.15 .74 -0.28 .41 52.3
Max. parent education 0.00 .92 -0.05 .23 53.8
Wages 0.35 .03 0.39 .01 57.2
Spouse earns $200/Wk 0.18 .65 0.31 .33 51.1
Military job 0.58 .01 0.51 .01 61.2
Benefits 0.27 .03 0.22 .04 52.6
Military life style 0.15 .21 0.11 .28 54.7
Relationships 0.22 .08 0.23 .04 55.4
N=327
% correctly classified 70.0
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Table E.8 Reenlistment intentions logit results,
second term females
Actual Reserve Intentions: 48.8%
Full Model Sinqle Variable
Variable Sign. Sign. % Correctly
Beta Level Beta Level Classified
Intercept -5.08 .08
Entry Age -0.03 .53 -0.04 .26 51.9
Black 0.73 .01 0.65 .01 58.1
Hispanic 0.13 .81 -0.05 .91 51.2
Combat support 0.25 .84 0.07 .77 51.2
Combat support service 0.30 .82 0.34 .15 54.3
Medical services -0.31 .81 -0.57 .05 54.0
Single with dependents 0.47 .24 0.67 .03 56.0
Married no dependents -0.25 .52 -0.37 .21 52.2
Married with dependents -0.03 .92 0.01 .98 51.2
Civilian opportunities -0.10 .05 -0.09 .04 56.4
Advancement rate -0.01 .81 0.01 .88 51.9
College education -0.33 .33 -0.62 .03 54.6
Max. parent education -0.02 .62 -0.05 .24 52.6
Wages 0.55 .01 0.38 .03 55.0
Spouse earns $200/Wk -0.30 .53 0.29 .49 51.2
Military job 0.49 .01 0.43 .01 57.4
Benefits 0.03 .85 0.02 .88 51.2
Military life style 0.03 .78 -0.05 .65 48.8
Relationships 0.13 .33 0.05 .65 54.0
N=291
% correctly classified 65.6
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Appendix F. Actual versus predicted Reserve intentions
and reenlistment intentions
Table F.l. Actual Reserve intentions versus predicted
Reserve intentions (by the full model)
by gender and term of services
% Correctly Actual Predicted Intentions
Term Gender Predicted Intentions No Yes

















Table F.2. Actual reenlistment intentions versus predicted
reenlistment intentions (by the full model)








; Correctly Actual Predicted Intentions
Predicted Intentions No Yes


















This Appendix demonstrates how to use the estimated logistic regression
models to calculate the base case probabilities and partial effects of changes in
individual variables on probabilities of joining the Reserves or reenlisting. In
these models if an individual intends to join the Reserves (or reenlist in the
reenlistment models), the dependent variable (Y) is coded as Y=l.
The probability that Y=l for the binary logistic regression model, P, is
given by the expression
P=Prob (Y=l
|
individual i ) =1/ ( 1+EXP (-A-X-jB) )
,
where A is the intercept parameter,
B=(B^ B^) denote the vector of m estimated regression parameters, and,
X-^ is the vector of m explanatory variables for the ith individual.
Table G presents the estimated parameters, A and B, and the vector of
independent variables used to calculate the base case for the probability of
joining the Reserves for first term males. As shown in Table 14, the vector of
explanatory variables losed for the base case calculation contains the mean values
for the continuous variables and the value of zero for each dummy variable.
The value of (-A-X-^B) for this example is .999. Therefore, the base case
probability of joining the Reserves, Pj-^ProbCY^llbase case X-jJ , is
Pbc = l/( 1+EXP (.999)) = .269
Hence, the base case probability for Reserve enlistment intentions in Table 15 is
given as .27.
To calculate the partial effects of each explanatory variable taken one at
a time, the same procedure as for the base case values of the explanatory
variables are used with the exception that the explanatory variable whose partial
effect is being assessed has a new value. For example, the probability of a
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Table G. Sample logistic calculations
Base case for first term male reserve intentions








































Satisfaction with military job
Satisfaction with military benefits
Satisfaction with military lifestyle
Satisfaction with relationships
(-A-XjB) = .999
Pbc = l/l+EXP(-A-X-jB) = .269
X-ji = value of jth variable for individual i.
Bj = coefficient of jth variable in first term male Reserve intentions model
member joining the Reserves who has the base case characteristics except is in a
combat support MOS, not a combat MOS, is:
P = 1/(1 + EXP(.999-(-.141))) = .242
In this example the value of .999 was obtained from the base case
calculation and (1 * -.141) is the change in -A-XjB for the combat support MOS.
The partial effect of being in a combat support MOS as compared to a combat MOS
on prior service Reserve enlistment intentions is then given by .242 - .269 =
-.027 as indicated in Table 15.
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Appendix H. Reserve intention probability estimates
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
B X BX X BX
A -.251
Contract -.357 1 -.357
Black 1.570 1 1.570
Hispanic .454
Combat support -.141 1 -.141
Combat support services .277
Medical service -9.103
Single with dependents .579
Married without dependents -.963 1 -.963
Married with dependents 1.030
2 yrs college education 1.561 1 1.561
Spouse earns $200+/wk .713
Entry age -.147 18 -2.646 22 -3.234
Civilian opportunities .019 8.04 .154 8.04 .154
Advancement rate -.075 8.47 -.633 11.47 -.860
Maximum parental education -.034 13.48 -.458 13.48 -.458
Wages .361 9.18 3.315 9.18 3.315
Satis, with military job .737 -.22 -.159 -.22 -.159
Satis, with military benefits .140 .06 .008 .06 .008
Satis, with military lifestyle .542 -.14 -.073 -.14 -.073
Satis, with military relationships .267 -.38 -.102 -.38 -.102
(-A-XiB) -.368 1.203
Prob (Y=l|Xi) .591 .231
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